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Abstract 
This thesis reports the development of an approach to two-sided matching prob-
lem — a group decision process whereby a set of actors and a set of mates are 
matched up by a central authority. We have three main concerns —(1) the 
solution approach whereby the solution matching is generated in accordance 
with the mutual preference of actors and mates; (2) the candidates'(actors' and 
mates') effort involved in assessing their own preferences; (3) the incentive of 
the candidates to misrepresent their preferences. 
We identify the disadvantages of the traditional one-off approach to matching 
problem. Firstly, it requires a fair and rational matching function, but we show 
that such a function doesn't exist. Secondly, a complete preference list must be 
elicited from each candidate in order to guarantee a good solution matching and 
keep the candidates' incentive of strategic manipulation low. 
We develop the arbitration approach to matching problem, in which the 
matching problem is formulated as a bargaining problem. The innovation of 
this approach lies on its solution approach and the interaction between the 
central authority and the candidates. It relies on a fair and rational matching 
correspondence (a function that generate a set of good solution matchings), 
which does exist. Iterative preference elicitation introduced can guarantee good 
iii 
solutions without eliciting complete preference lists and also keep the incentive 
of strategic manipulation low. 
The work conducted is likely to be the first that introduces iterative prefer-
ence elicitation and formulates the two-sided matching problem as bargaining. 
The iterative approach to preference elicitation, in particular, seem to be very 
promising from a practical point of view. 
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1.1 The Matching Process 
In this thesis, we are concerned with two-sided one-to-one matching. There are 
a set of actors and a set of mates, and they are going to be matched up one-to-
one. For example, in project assignment, each project is going to be assigned to 
a student. 
In general, each mate has preference over the actors and each actor has 
preference over the mates. In project assignment, say, a student may prefer 
projects of his own interest, or projects whose supervisors are more preferable. 
A supervisor, on the other hand, obviously likes to recruit smart students with 
good academic results, especially those who are good at subjects related to the 
projects he is offering. 
We are concerned with the group decision process through which the actors 
and mates are matched up in such a way that is fair and the satisfaction of the 
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actors and mates are maximized in some sense. We concerned only with match-
ing problems in which fairness is of primary importance. Matching problems in 
which fairness is not important, such as resouce allocation and task scheduling, 
are not under the domain of our investigation. 
1.2 Centralization 
Consider a typical example of one-to-one matching 一 project assignment. Sup-
pose there are n projects and n students. Through matching process, each 
project is going to be assigned to a student. 
The matching process can be completely decentralized. Students can apply 
for as many projects as they wish. Consider a particular supervisor, who is 
considering a set of m applicants. Having evaluated their qualifications, he 
must decide which one to admit. Admitting the best qualified student will not 
be satisfactory if it cannot be assumed that the admitted applicant will accept 
his offer. The problem of determining which applicant to admit requires some 
rather involved guesswork. 
In usual practice, the communication procedure is centralized, but project 
supervisors still hold the authority of determining which student to admit. A 
central agent handles the communication between the project supervisors and 
students. Each student is allowed to apply for a number of projects and is 
requested to rank the applied projects according to their preferences. The central 
agent then forwards the students' applications to project supervisors concerned. 
With the students' ranking, supervisors can then make better decision of which 
applicant to admit. However, a student may feel that by telling a project is, say, 
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third choice will hurt his chances of being admitted. 
In completely centralized matching procedure, both the communication and 
the admission authority are centralized. A central authority handles the deci-
sion process and determines the final assignment. Each student is required to 
reveal their preferences to the central authority. Each project's supervisor is 
then required to reveal its ranking of applicants. The central authority then 
determines the final matching in accordance to their mutual preference. Under 
sucli a completely centralized procedure, previously mentioned problems faced 
by supervisors and students are avoided. The only problem the students and 
supervisors face is preference elicitation. 
1.3 One-off Approach 
The traditional approach to centralized matching is the one-off approach, in 
which the interaction between the candidates and the central authority is sim-
plest. The central authority first elicits preferences from the actors and mates, 
usually in the form of preference lists. Then the collected preference lists is 
fed into a matching function to determine the way of matching the actors and 
mates. Matching problem is a group decision making process in which the fa-
mous Arrow's Impossibility Theorem [8] points out that there is no ideal way of 
combining the candidates' preferences into group preference. So, we anticipate 
that there is also no ideal matching function, or equivalently, there is in general 
no ‘best’ way of matching. 
For large matching problems, it may be too demanding or even impractical 
to request each candidate to rank all candidates of the opposite side. Usually, 
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the candidates are requested to reveal their first few choices only. We doubt 
whether it is in general possible to guarantee a good matching with only partial 
preference lists. Also, we observed that the candidates will probably not reveal 
their true preferences. That is, it seems to increase the candidates' incentive of 
misrepresenting preference. 
In this thesis, we study matching problem in three aspects: (1) the matching 
rule, (2) the candidates' preference assessment effort, and (3)the candidates' 
incentive of misrepresenting preference. Based on these studies, we can formulate 
the problems faced by the one-off approach. Then, we introduce the arbitration 
approach to the matching problem. 
1.4 Our Approach 
Having noticed the disadvantages of the one-off approach, we introduce the 
arbitration approach. 
We find out that although a fair and ideal matching function does not exist, a 
fair and rational matching correspondence (a matching rule that ends up with a 
set of good solutions) does exist. So, in the arbitration approach, the candidates 
are then allowed to bargain on this choice set so that a compromise solution is 
obtained. 
Also, we introduce iterative preference elicitation. We anticipate that this 
approach to elicitation can reduce the candidates' decision effort while keeping 
their incentive of misrepresenting preference low. 
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1.5 Organization 
In chapter 2, we introduce some notations and background concepts in decision 
theory that are used in this thesis. 
Chapter 3 and 4 reports the findings on our three main concerns of matching 
problem. Chapter 3 investigate the possibility of a rational and fair matching 
rule. Chapter 4 concerns the candidates' decision effort as well as their strategic 
manipulation in the preference elicitation process. 
Chapter 5 summarizes the disadvantages of the one-off approach, and intro-
duces the arbitration approach. Chapter 6 introduces an arbitration protocol 
that illustrates the advantages of the approach. 
We finally conclude the thesis in chapter 7 by summarizing our main contri-




In this chapter, we summarize some important concepts and notations in decision 
theory that we use in this thesis. We introduce two models that describe the 
preference of a rational decision maker, and two approaches to group decision 
making. 
2.1 Ordinal Preference 
2.1.1 Strict Preference and Indifference 
When a rational decision maker compares any two alternatives a and b, he 
should hold exactly one of the followings, 
• he strictly prefers a to b 
• he strictly prefers 6 to a 
• he is indifferent between a and b 
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We will write Ci C2 to mean that the decision maker strictly prefers a to 
6. That is, whenever he faces the choice between a and b, he will choose a. A 
rational man's preference should satisfy transitivity and asymmetricity, that is 
Transitivity If for any 3 alternatives a, c, the decision maker holds a y 
c, then he must also hold aye. 
Asymmetric For any 2 alternatives a, b，if the decision maker holds a y b, 
then he cannot hold h y a 
We will write a � b to mean that the decision maker is indifferent between 
alternative a and b. That is, whenever he faces the choice between alternative 
a and b, he would be equally happy to choose a Or B, The indifference of a 
rational decision maker should satisfy transitivity, reflexivity and symmetricity, 
that is 
Transitivity If for any 3 alternatives a,b,c，the decision maker holds a � 
6, 6 � c , then he must also hold a � c . 
Reflexivity for all alternative Ci, Ci � Q 
Symmetricity for any two alternatives a, h, if the decision maker holds a �h， 
then he must also hold b � a . 
Just as we demand that and � w e r e individually transitive, so it seems 
reasonable to assume that they are jointly transitive, 
Joint Transitivity For any 3 alternatives a,b,c，if the decision maker holds 
a � h and bye，then he must also hold a c. And, if he holds a y b and b �c， 
then he must also hold a y c. 
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2.1.2 Weak Preference 
Weak preference is actually a more compact notation that encapsulates both 
strict preference and indifference. We will write a y b to mean the decision 
maker weakly prefers object a to object 6, or equivalently, he holds a to be at 
least as good as b. The idea that weak preference tries to encapsulate is that 
whenever the decision maker holds a ^ 6, he holds either a b on a � b . Weak 
preference should satisfy 
Comparability \/a,b e A, a y b or b y a or both holds. 
Transitivity Va, b,ce A, if a y h and h^c, then a^c. 
Consistency of indifference and weak preference For any pair of objects 
a,b G A，a � b (a t b and hy a) 
Consistency of strict preference and weak preference For any pair of 
objects £ A, a y b b ^ a 
2.2 Utility Theory 
A lottery C =< pi, ai;p2, 0,2] • - - cLn > is defined as a simple chance mecha-
nism whereby an alternative is chosen from A 二 {ai, a2,…，an} in such a way 
that alternative a; has probability of pi of being chosed. Utility theory investi-
gates a decision maker's preference over lotteries. 
We can assume, for a rational decision maker, the existence [5] of a utility 
function u(.) on A such that the decision maker holds: 
ai y dj u(ai) > u(aj) for any a “ a j G A 
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,and 
The assessment of the utility function can be performed as follows. Without 
loss of generality, let a： ^ a2 ^ as ^ . . . ^ a^ and u(ai) = = 1. A 
decision maker who assesses a probability p such that he is indifferent between 
the lottery < 1 > and ai has utility p for a,-, i.e. 二 p. 
2.3 Group Decision Making 
Social Choice theory investigates how the group preference may be constructed 
from individual decision makers based on binary tournaments.. Bargaining, on 
the other hand, considers the choice of several individual decision makers who 
may find it to their mutual advantage to co-operate in some way. 
2.3.1 Social Choice Theory 
Social choice theory concerns the problem of collective choice : there are n voters 
D = {(ii, c?2,..., dn} who are jointly responsible for choosing an alternative 
from a set of alternatives A = {ai, a2 , . . . , Each individual di has his own 
preference 匕.over A. A social choice instance is then characterized by (D,化i 
, • . . ， t n } ) . Social choice theory concerns how the group preference, tg , 
should be constructed from individual preferences in a way that is fair, just and 
rational. 
For the general social choice problem, Kenneth J.Arrow [8] listed a set of 
axioms and suggested that they encode the minimal requirement of a fair and 
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rational constitution. He went on to show that they are mutually contradictory. 
Theorem 1 Arrow's impossibility theorem There is no constitution which 
allows yg to be defined from in a manner which is consistent 
with the following axioms : 
Axiom 1 • •., ^n are weak orders. 
Axiom 2 (Non-triviality) There are at least two members and three alterna-
tives. 
Axiom 3 (Universal Domain) ^g is defined whatever ^i, ...，tn are. 
Axiom 4 (Positive Responsiveness) Suppose that some alternatives are deleted 
from the set of alternatives, A. Then, if no individual changes his preferences 
between the alternatives that remain, the group preference between these alter-
natives does not change. 
Axiom 5 (Unanimity) If every individual holds a y-i b, then the group holds 
a yg b 
Axiom 6 (No dictatorship) There is no individual whose preferences auto-
matically become the preferences of the group independently of the other' mem-
bers. 
On the other hand, Plott [6] investigated the possibility of a social choice 
correspondence (a multi-valued function that associates each preference profile 
with a choice set — a subset of the alternatives from which the final choice may 
be made quite arbitrarily without any risk of undemocratic choice). And they 
found it is just as impossible to define such a choice set as Arrow [8] found for 
a group weak order. 
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2.3.2 Bargaining 
Bargaining takes another approach to the problem of group decision making. For 
simplicity, we will introduce two-person bargaining. Let d ,^ d^  be the decision 
makers having utility functions W2(.)，respectively, over the set of alter-
natives. Each alternative, a:, can then be represented by a point (ui(x),U2(x)) 
in the real plane whose co-ordinates are given by the expected utilities of the 
bargain to d] respectively. The resulting set of points is called the feasible set 
R. Within R, there is a point {xc, Pc) known as the status quo or disagreement 
point. Whenever they can agree upon a point on R, then they can act in tandem 
in such a way that their expected utility are given by the agreed point. If they 
cannot reach agreement, then, by default, their expected utility are given by the 
status quo. 
We assumed that, for rational decision makers, they will confine their atten-
tion to the part of the pareto-optimal boundary of R that dominates the status 
quo point, called the bargaining set. Dominance is the relation 
(a;’ y) dominates y') \ix>x' and y>y' with strict inequality holding in 
at least one case. 
Both and d � w o u l d prefer any point on the bargaining set to the status 
quo, and so there is an incentive for them to reach an agreement on some point 
on it. 
To predict the outcome of the negotiation, Nash suggested four assumptions. 
Axiom 7 (Restriction to bargaining set) 
The point (a:*, y*), upon which they agree, is a member of the bargaining set. 
Axiom 8 (Symmetry) If the feasible region is symmetric, and if the status quo 
11 
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Expected Utilility of d! 
A T « 
( « 
Feasible Set , • ^-Bargaining Set 
/X Z 
i X …… 
* i V ^ / ' � s t a t u s quo 
—™^^^^ 
Expected Utilility of dg 
is syrivinetric, viz. x^ = y" thv the point upon which they (ujrrr is syninulrir, 
viz. X* = y*. 
Axiom 9 (Invariance under strategically equivalent representations) 
Let a new bargaining problem be obtained from the (yvujinal by l.ransjhnn.iiuj 
= … " ' i ( . ) + 人.、=(y-iM-) + Ih 
Then, if 广、is the point on which l.licy agree in the orif/inal prohlc.m,,(…广十 
/^i, + A) is the point upon which fJicy agnx in iJic new prohleuL 
Axiom 10 (Independence of the irrelevant alternatives) If two l)ar!jain-
ing prohlems are such, that the feasible region of Uia Htxond is a suhsc.l of the 
first, R' C R； and if the status quo point (•'/;�ijc) is coiiivhon to both,, Uic.ih if 
the point upou which the bavgamevH af/rre in the jlrst problem, also lies 
in R!, (x*, ；//*) is also the point upon which they a</r(X in the HCCOIKI prohlcni. 
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Theorem 2 (Nash) If Axioms 1-4 hold, then the point uniquely max-
the function {x 一 Xc){y - ？/e) on R, providing there are points in R such 
that oc > Xc,y > yc 
We call the solution {x\y*) the Nash bargaining solution. 
13 
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The Matching Rule 
This chapter concerns the role of the central authority as a matchmaker, whom 
we assume to have obtained the mutual preferences of actors and mates towards 
one another. A matchmaker determines how to match up the actors and mates 
in accordance with their mutual preference. The problem the matchmaker thus 
faces is what the 'best, way of matching up the actors and mates is. Or, the 
matchmaker looks for a matching rule that is fair and rational. 
Definition 1 A matching rule is a rule/algorithm that generates a solution 
matching based on the mutual preference of the actors and mates. 
The aim of this chapter is two fold. Firstly, we capture the intuitive idea of 
fairness and rationality into precisely defined axioms. Secondly, we investigate 
the possibility of a matching rule that is fair and rational with respect to the 
axioms. 
14 
Chapter 3 The Matching Rule 
3.1 The Marriage Model 
The model and notations that we will use to describe matching problem is the 
marriage model [2]. The elements of the marriage model are as follows. There 
are two finite and disjoint sets M and W: M = {mi,m2, is the set of n 
men, and W = {wi,w2, ...,Wr} is the set of r women. The two sets may be of 
unequal size. Each man has preferences over the women, and each woman has 
preferences over the men. We will use candidate as the common description of 
actor and mate. 
We assume that the preferences of men and women are rational and strict, 
and let y ^ , describe the preferences of man m and woman w respectively. 
To express their mutual preferences concisely, the preferences of man m and 
woman w will be represented by a preference list p(m), p[w) respectively. A 
man m,s preference list might be of the form 
indicating that m prefers to be paired with Wi to w^^ w^ to and so on. That 
is Wi ^ni ^rn • • • . 
p{w) is similarly defined. 
Let Pm, 'Pw be the set of all possible preference lists of a man and a woman, 
respectively. Denote PM,W 二 {p(mi),p(m2)’ ...，Kmn)’Kwi),P—2)，...，K叫)} 
as the preference profile — the set of preference lists of all men and women. A 
specific matching instance will then be characterized by the triple (M, Pm.w)-
Definition 2 A matching fi is a one-to-one correspondence from the set M U 
W onto itself of order two (that i s ， = x) such that if fi{m) • m then 
15 
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"(m) G W and if fi{a) ^ a then G M. We refer to /j,{x) as the //-partner 
of X. 
A matching specifies a way of pairing up the actors and mates, in a one-to-one 
manner. We can also represent a matching by a set of actor-mate pairs 
// = {(m, If；) I m G M, w; e //(m) = w /i(w) = m} 
We will refer matching either as a one-to-one correspondence or as a set of actor-
mate pairs without ambiguity. We denote M as the set of all possible matchings 
and define matching function and matching correspondence as follows: 
Definition 3 A matching function is a mapping (pf that maps each possible 
preference profile to a unique matching. 
A matching correspondence is a multi-valued mapping (p�that maps each 
possible preference profile to a set of matchings. 
3.2 Stability 
In 1962, Gale and Shapley [7] introduced the notion of stability in matching 
problem. Since then, a lot of literature has grown from this paper. However, 
not many matching rules has been proposed and all of them are built around 
the concept of stability. We will first briefly describe the notion of stability and 
then review some matching functions found in the literature. 
Suppose in a matching problem, the matchmaker matches up the men and 
the women according to matching in which there exist a man m and a woman 
w who are not matched to one another in /x, but who prefer each other to their 
assignment in /i. That is, w /^(m), m fi�w�. Then, if they know each 
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other's preference, there will be an incentive for them to defect the assignment 
“ m a d e by the matchmaker and pair up themselves. We call such a matching /i 
an unstable matching. 
Definition 4 A man-woman pair (m，w) blocks the matching fi if and only if 
^ —m "(m), m fj,{w). We call {m,w) a blocking pair of fx. A matching “ 
is stable if and only if there is no blocking pair in fi，and is otherwise unstable. 
In practice, the blocking pair (m, w) may not know each others' preference, 
or the rule of the game does not allow them to defect the matching. Anyway, 
from the normative point of view, unstable matching is not desirable. It is 
proved that stable matching exists for every marriage instance. 
Theorem 3 (Gale and Shapley) [7]. A stable matching exists for every mar-
riage instance. 
In this thesis, we regard stability as a fundamental criterion of the solution 
matching. In general, stable matching is not unique, and in fact, the number of 
stable matchings can grow exponentially with the size of the marriage instance 
1]. We denote M s as the set of all stable matchings. 
3.3 Survey of Matching Functions 
Gale and Shapley[7] noticed that within the set of all possible matchings, there 
are two matchings, namely the man-optimal matching and the woman-optimal 
matching, which have some nice properties. The most important property is 
that they are unique and always exist in all possible marriage instances. More-
over, they can be efficiently computed. In man-optimal matching, each man has 
17 
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the best partner that he can have in any stable matching. On the other hand, 
each woman has the worst partner that she can have in any stable matching. 
Similarly, in woman-optimal matching, each man has the best partner and each 
woman has the worst partner that they can have in any stable matching. Obvi-
ously，man-optimal matching biases towards men while woman-optimal match-
ing biases towards women. 
Irving, Leather and Gusfield [1] introduced parametric stable matching which 
aims at a matching rule that selects a matching from M s in a fair way — a way 
that treats each individual equally, regardless of sex. Instead of a preference 
list, each candidate p is required to reveal a real number weight c(p, q) for each 
person q of opposite sex; then p prefers ^ to 5 if and only if q) > c{p, s). For 
a fixed value of parameter A, and a stable matching define 
二 A X ^ c{m,w) + c{w,m) 
(m,w)eM (m,w)eM 
Then, as a function of parameter A, define 
F{X) = m in {C“A) | // G 
A matching “ for which F{X) 二 C “ A ) is called X-optimal matching. Notice that 
F(0) is the man-optimal matching while F{oo) is the woman-optimal matching. 
Notice that setting A = 0 biases extremely to men, resulting in F(0), which is the 
man-optimal matching. And, increasing A increases the bias towards women. 
Set ting A 二 oo biases extremely towards women, resulting in F(oo) , which is 
the woman-optimal matching. Besides the problem of determination of A, the 
rationality behind minimization of the specified summation is rather weak. 
All in all, the search for a good matching function seems not to be very 
successful. 
18 ^ 
Chapter 3 The Matching Rule 
3.4 Possibilities of Matching Function 
Despite the bias involved in man-optimal and woman-optimal matching rules, 
they are frequently used in practice. The reason, as we will show below, is simply 
that there is no fair and rational matching function. 
Consider the problem of matching two actors (cti, (22) to two mates (mi, m?)， 
whose mutual preferences are: 
i^(mi) = {«1,«2} P(aa) = {m2, mi } 
P(m2) = {a2,ai} P�a2�= {mi^m?} 
The only two possible matchings are: 
f^i = i,«i)，(m2’a2)} 
= { (mi,a2) , (m2,ai) } 
Both matchings are stable, and in fact, fii is the man-optimal stable match-
ing, fi2 is the woman-optimal stable matching. Matching fii matches actors 
to their first choices, and mates to their second choices. Matching fj,2 matches 
actors to their second choices, mates to their first choices. 
Notice the symmetry in the preference profile — each candidates' most pre-
ferred partner prefers himself least. For instance, actor ai prefers mate mi most, 
but mi prefers a! least. We can see that both matchings are equally good, except 
they treat actors and mates differently — fj,i biased towards the favor of actors 
while fi2 biased towards the favor of mates. The matchmaker cannot choose any 
of //i, fi2 deterministically, rationally and unbiasly. Indeed, the only fair and 
rational way is to select randomly from {/^i, ^2}' We conclude that there does 
not exist a fair and rational matching function. 
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3.5 Possibilities of Matching Correspondence 
In this section, we re-formulate the matching problem as a social choice prob-
lem，and then we investigate the possibilities of a fair and rational matching 
correspondence. 
3.5.1 Matching Problem as Social Choice 
A matching problem (M, W; Pm,w) can be modeled as a social choice problem 
(D; PD), in which the actors and mates collectively select a matching from the 
set of all possible matching M, That is, the set of decision makers is D = MUW, 
and the set of alternatives is A = M. 
We assume that all men and women are selfish in the sense that a man's 
(woman's) preference over matchings depends solely on with whom he (she) will 
be matched in the matchings. The preference of a man m over A, denoted by 
h'm^ and the preference of a woman w over A, denoted by can then be 
generated from his/her preferences over the women/men as follows: 
for any fii,fi2 G M , 
fJ'i h'm iff fJ'iim) y^n 
f^ i h'a iff "1(a) "2(a) 
h'm h'm "2 进 = "2(肌） 
fJ'l ha h'm IJ'2 iff ⑷二 " 2 � 
This formulation ignored the difference between men and women, and there-
fore stability is not defined in this model. In other words, the matching problem 
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is not as detail described in social choice model as in marriage model. 
Let Vd be the set of all possible preference profile of D thus generated. Note 
that in the formulation, each decision makers' preference domain is restricted, 
and so does the domain of the preference profile. 
A social choice correspondence is a multi-valued mapping ips from Vd 
to A. To any preference profile P^ G Vd, a choice correspondence associates a 
nonempty subset (Ps(Pd) of 'best' outcome, called the choice set. 
For the social choice problem, Plott [6] showed that in general, there is no fair 
and rational social choice correspondence. It seems that the matching problem, 
which can be modeled as a social choice problem, also faces this negative result. 
But, since the social choice problem formulated from matching problem has a 
restricted domain of preference profiles, it may be possible to find an "ideal" 
choice correspondence. Whether the matching problem can escape from Plott's 
negative result is investigated in the following subsection. 
3.5.2 Possibilit ies 
As we have mentioned, in the social choice problem formulated from marriage 
problem, the domain of the preference profile is restricted. For instance, no 
actor/mate will have strict preference over all matchings in M. Here, we are not 
going to investigate the structure of the preference profile of the social choice 
problem generated from the matching problem. Instead, we are going to prove 
that under such restricted preference domain, weak Condorcet winner always 
exists. 
Definition 5 A binary majority tournament is a binary relation T: for 
each pair of alternatives a , 6 6 A , aTb iff more voters prefer a to b. 
21 
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^ weak Condorcet winners is an alternative a that never loses in binary 
majority tournaments, i.e. fih e A such that hTa. 
Let W be the set of all weak Condorcet winner. The following theorems 
show that weak Condorcet winner always exists in matching problem. 
Theorem 4 (Roth) [3] In a matching problem in which the sets of men and 
^oman are of unequal sizes, there is at least one stable matching in which all the 
members of the smaller set are matched. Furthermore, all the members of the 
smaller set are matched in Ms, and the larger set is partitioned into two subsets， 
the members of one subset being always matched in Ms and the memhers of the 
other in none. 
Theorem 5 The set of all stable matchings Ms is a subset of the set of all weak 
Condorcet winner W, in all matching problems. 
Proof: Without loss of generality, let n > r，i.e. there are more men than 
women. By Theorem 4, all women will be matched in any of Ms. Let he any 
stable matching, and fi he any matching (stable or otherwise). Let 
(i) X and Y (respectively X' and Y') denote the sets of men and women who 
prefer fig to fi (respectively /i to lis), 
(ii) I be the set of men which are unmatched in both fig and fi, 
(Hi) U be the set of men which are matched in fig but not in fi， 
(iv) U' he the set of men which are matched in fi hut not in /is 
Notice that X U X'U U U U I = M and Y U V = W. 
In [1 there can be no pair (m, w) with m G X', w G Y', for such a pair would 
block fis. So, every man in X' has an fx-partner in Y, and therefore \X'\ < |y|. 
Similarly, every woman in Y' has an fi-partner in X，and therefore | < \X\. 
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On the other hand, men in I are indifferent between fx^ and fi. Men in U 
prefers fx^ to fi and men in U' prefers fj, to fXs-
whole，+ + < + |y| + In other words, majority of 
candidates prefers fx^ to fi. So, a stable matching never loses in binary majority 
tournaments, and therefore, the set of all stable matchings is a subset of the set 
of all weak Condorcet winners, i.e. Ms C W. 
Q.E.D. 
Theorem 6 Weak Condorcet winner always exists in a matching problem. 
Proof: By Theorem 1，a stable matching exists in all matching problem, and by 
Theorem 5，Ms C W. So, a weak Condorcet winner always exists in a matching 
problem. 
Q.E.D. 
Let ip^c be the matching correspondence that elects all weak Condorcet win-
ners and we call it W C correspondence. The following listed a set of axioms 
found in literature that are used to qualify a fair and rational social choice 
correspondence. We found that 切�is consistent with all these axioms. 
Axiom 11 Condorcet Consistent A Condorcet winner is an alternative (nec-
essarily unique) that defeats every other candidates in majority tournament. 
Though a Condorcet winner does not necessarily exist (actually, it rarely exists), 
it should be selected whenever it exists. 
Axiom 12 Non-dominance Alternative a dominates alternative b if and only 
if a is unanimously preferred to b, and we call b a dominated alternative. Dom-
inated alternatives should not he elected. 
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Axiom 13 Anonymity The names of voters do not matter: the outcome of 
the election will not be affected if two voters exchange their votes. 
Axiom 14 Neutrality The name of the candidates does not matter: If we 
exchange two alternative a and b in the ordering of each voter, then the election 
changes accordingly (if a was previously elected, then b now is, and vice versa; 
if some x different from a and h was elected，it still is) 
Axiom 15 Monotonicity Suppose a is elected at a given profile and that the 
profile is changed only in as much as the ranking of a improves，the relative 
comparison of any other pair of alternatives by any voter being unaffected, then 
a is still elected at the new profile. 
Axiom 16 Reinforcement Two disjoint groups of voters N^N] face the same 
set A of alternatives. If the electorate Ni selects subset 双 for i=l，2, electorate 
Ni U N2 should select Bi N B2 as the set of equally best outcomes if Bi and B] 
intersect. 
Theorem 7 The WC correspondence satisfies Axiom 11 - 16. 
Proof 
Axiom 11 - 15: Obvious. 
Axiom 16: 
Va 6 召1 n V6 G A\Bi D B2, the majority of voters prefer a to h in both 
Ni and N2. Therefore, majority of voters prefers a to h in NiU N2. 
Q.E.D. 
In other words, ip霞 is an ideal social choice correspondence with respect to 
the Axioms 11-16. 
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3.6 Conclusions 
We have showed that there is no ideal matching function. In practice, with 
the one-off approach, the matchmaker should select matching function that can 
be recommended on some theoretical background such as mate-optimal stable 
matching, actor-optimal stable matching, parametric optimal stable matching, 
etc. The matchmaker faces the problem of which matching function to choose. 
On the other hand, from the social choice point of view, we have found 
the WC correspondence is an ideal social choice correspondence (with respect 
to the specified axioms) in marriage problem. That is, all weak Condorcet 
winners are good matchings and are equally good. Note however that the notion 
of stability is not defined in the social choice problem. There may be weak 
Condorcet winners that it is not stable, and should be eliminated. Since M s is 
a subset of weak Condorcet winners, we conclude thatA^^ is an ideal matching 
correspondence. 
Due to the non-uniqueness of the solution set, some mechanism has to be 
introduced to select a matching from Ms- Since the matchings in M s are equally 




This chapter concerns the role of the central authority as an elicitor. During 
the elicitation process, the elicitor elicits preferences while the candidates assess 
their own preferences. We concentrate on (1) the candidates' outranking effort 
involved in the elicitation process and (2) the candidates' incentive of strategic 
manipulation. 
4.1 Outranking 
We refer to the process whereby a candidate works out his preference outrank-
ing. We are not going to study the outranking methods, but to point out that 
outranking is a decision process. It is reasonable to assume that the outrank-
ing effort increases with the number of alternatives to rank. And, when the 
size of the matching problem is large, it may not be practical to elicit complete 
preference lists from the candidates. 
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4.2 Strategic Manipulation 
We assume that the actors and the mates are selfish in that they care only 
with whom they will be matched. An actor/mate may have an incentive to 
misrepresent his preference if he may be matched to a better mate/actor as a 
result. From the elicitors point of view, it is desirable that all actors and mates 
reveal their true preference. Otherwise, it is complicated, or even impossible, 
for the matchmaker to find a matching which is good with respect to their true 
preference. The strategic problem is formulated as follows. 
Consider a matching instance {A, M, FA,M) and the matchmaker employ 
matching function (py to produce the solution matching, based on preference 
lists that candidates supply. Each mate m, whose preferences are p(m) , is faced 
with the problem of deciding what preference list q(m) to state, and each actor 
with preferences p(a) must state a preference list q(a). Denote the set of stated 
preference list by Q 二 {q{ai), q{a2) ,…’ g(a„)，q{rm), 乂 m ? ) , . . . , q{mp)}. 
We refer to stable matching function as a matching function that always 
returns stable matching. Roth [3] proved that for any stable matching func-
tion, there are always some candidates that can profitably misrepresent their 
preferences, if they know others' preference, as well as the matching function. 
Theorem 8 Impossibility theorem (Roth) No stable matching mechanism 
exists for which stating the true preferences is always the best response for every 
candidate when all other candidates states their true preferences. 
In other words, if the matchmaker employs a stable matching function, strate-
gic manipulation is not avoidable. 
27 
Chapter 4 Preference Elicitation 
4.3 One-off Elicitation 
The simplest and most straightforward preference elicitation protocol is that the 
elicitor makes a single request to each actor and mate for preference. We call it 
one-off elicitation approach. 
The one-off approach has the advantage that there is minimal interaction 
between arbitrator and actor/mate, but it has a major drawback : the elicitor, 
to ensure that the matchmaker can find a stable matching, must elicit complete 
preference lists from all actors and mates. 
Theorem 9 With one-off procedure and partial preference lists, the matchmaker 
cannot guarantee stability in matching. 
Proof Let P he the true complete preference profile of which there is only one 
stable matching fi and m he a particular mate. Since the preference information 
is partial, it is possible that there exist an actor a such that m fj,(a) but 
whether fi{m) ^^ a or not is unknown. That is whether fj, is stable is unknown. 
The matchmaker cannot find any matching that is stable for sure. 
Q.E.D. 
As we have mentioned, outranking involves decision effort. For matching 
problem of large size, say 100 actors and 100 mates, the effort involved in ranking 
100 alternatives may be prohibitive. In such cases, the elicitor may sacrifice 
stability and elicit partial preferences only. In practice, it is common to request 
from each candidate a few most preferred alternatives and the matchmaker treats 
such alternatives as their most preferred choices to generate a matching. Two 
problems then arises — vacancy handling and strategic manipulation. 
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Vacancy Handling 
Consider the problem of matching 4 actors to 4 mates, and 2 choices are re-
quested from each actor and mate. The collected preferences are shown below 
(assuming that they all reveal their true preference): 
p(mi) : {ai , “2) p(ai):{mi,m2} 
P(m2) : {ai，as} 
: Wu «2} K«3):{mi,m2} 
p(m4) : {ai , “2} p(a4):{mi,m2} 
• 5 ) : {ai, a2} 
The pair (mi, ai) prefers each other most and should undoubtedly be matched 
up. Similarly, m � s h o u l d be paired with a � . Then, mate ms, m^, m^ should 
be matched with actor as, 04. But, the elicitor hasn't elicited any preferences 
of ms, 1714,7715 over 03，o^，and any preference of a3,a4 over ms, 7724,7715. The 
matchmaker can match them randomly. Or, he can leave as, 04 vacant and 
then employs a vacancy handling procedure to fill up the vacancies with two of 
7711, 1712, 7713. 
strategic Manipulation 
It is quite obvious that the candidate will have incentive to minimize their risk of 
not being matched within their stated choice by misrepresenting their preference. 
In the previous example, 7723,1714, m^, 0^ 3, may somehow know that they are 
probably not able to be matched with the first two most preferred choice. So, in 
order to avoid not being matched with their stated choice or entering vacancy 
handling procedure, they may misrepresent their preference, shown below: 
p(m3) : {as, «4} : {m3,m4] 
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咖4) ： {as, a^} ： {m^^rris} 
So the final matching will be {(ma, ag), {m^, a, ) } . Eliciting partial preference 
increases the candidates' incentive to make strategic choice. 
4.4 Conclusion 
With one-off elicitation, the elicitor faces a dilemma. If he elicits a complete 
preference list from each candidate, the candidate's assessment effort involved 
in making their complete preference list may be too excessive to be practical. 
On the other hand, eliciting partial preference list sacrifices stability, increases 
the candidate's incentive to misrepresent their preference and raises the problem 




In this chapter, we introduce the arbitration model to matching problem. The 
innovation of this approach lies in the solution concept as well as the interaction 
between the candidates and the central authority. 
5.1 Arbitration Model 
In chapter three, we have shown that there is, in general, no best matching, and 
we have pointed out that it is fair and rational to select a matching randomly 
from Ms . This introduces arbitrariness in the matching mechanism, and it is de-
sirable if we could reduce the arbitrariness involved in the matching mechanism. 
Through bargaining, it is possible to reduce the arbitrariness while increasing 
the expected utility of each candidates. 
In chapter four, we pointed out the disadvantages of one-off elicitation. We 
believe that through iterative feedback and elicitation, it is possible to reduce 
the candidates' outranking effort while guaranteeing stability and keeping their 
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incentive of strategic manipulation low. 
Based on these observations, we introduce the arbitration approach to the 
matching problem. 
In the arbitration model, the central authority (called the arbitrator in this 
model) takes control of the flow of the decision process. He is also responsible 
for both eliciting the actors' and mates' preference, and matching them up. 
The decision process is divided into two stages, and each stage proceeds in 
rounds of preference elicitation from arbitrator to the mates and the actors. 
The only thing the candidates do is to respond to the arbitrator's request for 
preference information. So, in the arbitration model, there is no communication 
between actors, or between mates, or between actors and mates. That is, each 
mate/actor exchange information with the arbitrator only. 
Actor Mate 
...\ I ... 丨 
Actor \ / Mate 
Actor \ \ / ) M a t e 
Arbitrator 
The first stage aims at eliciting ordinal preferences from actors and mates to 
generate a choice set of matchings, C, according to a matching correspondence, 
(fc. The second stage aims at bargaining over the power set of C. 
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5.2 Stage I: Elicitation of Ordinal Preference 
In each round, the arbitrator requests partial preference from the candidates. 
Suppose, in a particular round, the arbitrator found that actor a: most prefers 
mate mi, and mate mi most prefers actor ai. Undoubtedly, mi should be 
matched with ai whatever the preference of the other candidates are. No matter 
how other actors rank mi, and how other mates rank ai, the final outcome of 
the matching rule is not changed. We call such preference dispensable binary 
preference, which is defined as follows. 
Let Pm[ai, aj) be the binary preference of mate m between actor a,- and aj, 
and Pm{ai, a^) = a,- if a,- ^rn CLj, a]) = aj if aj yrn (H. 
Definition 6 Consider a matching instance (M, A; PM,A) and the matchmaker 
employs matching correspondence vv Let Dp be a set of binary preferences of 
candidates p in which no matter how we invert the binary preferences in Dp under 
the restriction of maintaining the transitivity of p，s preference, the outcome of 
^c is unchanged. We call the binary preferences in D^ dispensable binary 
preferences. 
Suppose in a particular round, the binary preference is identified 
as dispensable. In the subsequent rounds, the elicitor should not request mate 
m for his preference between actor a,- and a) and this will save mate m's decision 
effort. 
The iteration terminates when sufficient preference information have been 
elicited for (fc to generate a choice set. 
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• 
> Elicit some preferences 
y 







The effectiveness of this protocol in reducing the candidates' assessment effort 
depends on (i) how the candidates assess their preferences, (ii) how the elici-
tor elicits preferences in each round, and (iii) the identification of dispensable 
preferences from partial preferences. 
Suppose a candidate is comparing two possible partners pi’p2, with respect 
to a number of criteria. If is significantly better than p2 in all/most of the 
criteria, he will strongly prefer pi to 仍 and he will find it easy to tell the 
preference. On the other hand, if pi and p2 are rather similar to each other, 
his preference between pi and p2 will be weak and he will find it hard to tell 
the preference. In general, the weaker the preference, the harder to tell the 
preference. The stronger the preference, the easier to tell the preference. 
The way in which the elicitor elicits preference in each round can take advan-
tage of this observation. For example, in the first few rounds, elicits preferences 
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that the candidates will find it easy to assess. Possibly, some hard preference 
will be identified as dispensable, and thus saving the corresponding assessment 
effort. 
Incentive of Strategic Manipulation 
The one-off elicitation approach that elicits partial preference lists introduces 
additional incentive of strategic manipulation, due at least in part to the match-
maker，s failure to guarantee stability (Theorem 9). Such incentive is eliminated 
in our iterative approach to elicitation so long as the elicited partial preferences 
suffice to generate the choice set C. 
5.3 Stage II: Bargaining 
The second stage is a bargaining stage. Through interaction with the arbitrator, 
the candidates settle to a subset C of C. Then a matching is randomly selected 
from C. The bargaining problem is formulated as follows. 
Assume that any actor a has a utility function Ua{.) over the mates, and any 
mate m has a utility function over the actors. Also, assuming all candidates 
are selfish, actor a's utility function < ( . ) and mate m's utility function 
over matchings, can be generated as follows: 
二 W a ( " � ） 
Let V{Ms) be the power set of Ms excluding the empty set. For each element in 
B of V{Ms) , which is a subset of Ms, we define the lottery to CB be the process 
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of choosing a matching from B randomly in such a way that each matching in B 
has equal chance of being chosen. A candidate d,s expected utility of the lottery 
CB will then be 
E,[CB] = ⑶ 糊 
B 
Each lottery, CB, can then be represented by a point 
(五[CBI £URS]’ … . ， E M , [CEI EM, [CBI …’五饥 
on the utility space. The resulting set of points will then be the feasible set of 
the bargaining. 
If agreement is not reached, a matching will then be randomly selected from 
M s . In other words, the status quo is the £乂，. 
5.4 Conclusion 
The arbitration approach relies on a fair and rational matching correspondence, 
which does exist. We have shown the possibility of reducing the candidates' 
assessment effort without sacrificing stability or increasing the candidates' in-




An Arbitration Protocol 
In this chapter, we introduce an arbitration protocol, which is based on the 
arbitration model. We describe in detail the protocol of each stage, and through 
example, illustrate the advantages of the protocol. 
6.1 Stage I: Top-down Preference Elicitation 
Stage I aims at eliciting sufficient preferences so that M s can be enumerated. 
6.1.1 The Protocol 
Top-down elicitation protocol, as its name implies, elicits the candidates' prefer-
ences, round by round, from their most preferred choices to their least preferred 
ones. In each round i, the elicitor will first send to each actor a a set of mates 
Ua, and each mate m a set of actors Um. Then the arbitrator requests each 
candidate p to reveal their ni{p), ni{p) < \ Up most preferred choice from Up. 
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y 
> Elicit iii (p) choices from each candidate p 
y 
Feedback Up to identify unstable pairs and reduce Up 





In each round, from the preferences collected in previous rounds, the arbi-
trator may be able to identify some unstable pairs. If (m, a) is identified to be 
unstable, as we will show later, no matter how a ranks m, and no matter how 
m ranks a in their preference list, the resulting set of stable matchings remains 
unchanged. In other words, they are dispensable binary preferences. 
In the first round, f/^ = M Va G A and f/^ = A Vm G M. So each 
candidate p is requested to rank his most preferred ni(p) choices from Up. In 
each subsequent round, Up will be reduced by eliminating (1) identified unstable 
partners of p, and (2) revealed choice in previous round. Actually, the remaining 
partners in Up will be those that have not been identified as unstable partners 
of p, and those that p has not yet revealed in previous rounds. 
The elicitation terminates when 二 0 Va G A, and "m 二 0 Vm G M. 
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6.1.2 Identification of Dispensable Preferences 
Suppose we have complete preference lists from all actors and mates. The ex-
tended Gale-Shapley algorithm[l] (abbrev. EGS algorithm) is an algorithm that 
“reduces，，these complete preference lists by eliminating unstable pairs, pairs 
that do not belong to any stable matching, from the preference list. By deleting 
an actor-mate pair (a,m), we mean deleting a from m，s preference list and m 
from that of a，s. 
We will first briefly describe how the algorithm works, and then we will 
modify the algorithm so that it can identify unstable pairs from partial preference 
lists. 
Extended Gale-Shapley Algorithm 
The EGS algorithm consists of a mate-oriented version and an actor-oriented 
version. The following shows the mate-oriented version of the EGS algorithm, 
and in the actor-oriented version, the role of actors and mates are interchanged. 
label each actor and mate to be free 
while some man m is free do 
begin 
w:= first woman on m,s preference list 
if some man p is engaged to w then 
assign p to be free 
assign m and w to be engaged to each other 
for each successor m' of m on w ’s list do 
delete the pair w) 
end 
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At the very beginning，each actor and mate is associated with a complete 
preference list, and during the execution of the algorithm, these preference lists 
are reduced by eliminating unstable partners. 
Consider the mate-oriented version of the algorithm. At any point during the 
algorithm's execution, each candidate is either engaged or free. The algorithm 
may be expressed in terms of processing a sequence of “proposals” from free 
mates to his most preferred actors in his current list (an engaged mate is not 
allowed to make proposals). A free actor always accepts proposals from any 
mate. An engaged actor will accept a proposal if he prefers the proposing mate 
to his currently assigned partner. 
If actor a receives a proposal from mate m and m' is any successor of m in 
a,s list, then the pair (a, m') cannot be a part of any stable matchings. So, for 
stable matchings, such a pair may well be deleted from the preference lists. We 
can further justify such deletions by observing that no deleted pair can block 
any matching consisting exclusively of undeleted pairs, for each actor prefers all 
the surviving mate on his list to those that have been deleted. 
The algorithm terminates when all mates are engaged, or all actors are en-
gaged — a situation that arises before any preference list becomes empty. 
For a given problem instance, we will refer to the final preference lists gen-
erated by the extended Gale-Shapley algorithm, with mate as proposers, as 
the MGS-lists. Similarly, if the roles of mate and actor in the algorithm are 
reversed, we obtain the AGS-lists. Finally, if we take for each person the 
intersection of his MGS-list and AGS-list, we obtain the GS-lists. 
Theorem 10 (Gusfield) [1] For a given marriage instance, (i) all stable match-
ings are contained in the GS-lists. (ii) no matching contained in the GS-lists 
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am he blocked by a pair that is not in the GS-list 
Therefore, to enumerate all stable matchings, the GS-list is sufficient. 
Modified EGS Algorithm 
We modified the EGS algorithm so that some unstable pairs can also be identified 
from partial preference profiles. The mate-oriented version of the modified EGS 
algorithm is shown below (similarly, in the actor-oriented version, the role of 
actor and mate are interchanged): 
assign each actor and mate to be free 
while some man m is free 
do begin 
if rn，s preference list is empty 
assign m to be idle 
else begin 
'w = first woman on m，s preference list 
if rn is not on w ,s preference list 
assign m to be idle 
else begin 
if some man p is engaged to w then 
assign p to be free 
assign m, w to be engaged to each other 
for each successor m' of m on w ,s list do 




Actually, the algorithm can be viewed as executing EGS algorithm "as far 
as possible". Consider what happens if we apply EGS algorithm to partial 
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preference lists. In each iteration, a free mate m make proposal to the first 
actor on his list. Problem arises if (1) m，s preference list is empty (2) m，s 
preference list is not empty, and a is the first mate on m's list. But we do 
not have sufficient preferences to identify all successors of m on a,s list simply 
because a's list is not complete. 
In the modified algorithm, whenever (1) or (2) happens, the proposer is set 
to idle, and the algorithm continues with other proposals. The algorithm ends 
whenever there is no free mate. So, by executing “as far as possible", we mean 
processing as many proposals as possible. In the mean time, the algorithm 
identifies as many unstable pairs as possible. 
Notice that, when all mates or all actors have been engaged, sufficient prefer-
ence information has already been elicited. The resulting list is the MGS-list. So, 
we will also use MGS algorithm to determine the end of the elicitation process. 
6.1-3 Enumeration of stable matchings 
The set of all stable matchings can be enumerated by first enumerating all 
possible matchings that are contained in the GS-list, and then selecting only 
those that are stable with the following stability checking algorithm. 
for i=l to n 
for each actor a such that m prefers a to /2{m) do 
if a prefers m to /j,(a) 
then begin 
report fi unstable 
break 
end 
report “ stable 
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More efficient algorithms can be found in [1 • 
6.1.4 Example 
Consider the elicitation of preferences from 8 actors to 8 mates. 
Round 1: Ua = M "ia e A,Um = ANm � 
The elicitor requests 8 choices from each mate and 3 choices from each actor. 
The collected preference information is shown below: 
Mate Preference 
J ^ i J L i 丄丄 i i 
J 丄 丄 丄 丄 H 
J L _ 5 _ J _ X _ i . _ 8 _ X J _ 
J §_丄丄丄丄丄 
_6 ^ m i i 丄丄 
_7 L i i 丄 
8 7 4 1 5 2 3 6 8 I—J— l _ l _ 
Actor Choices 
J 5__7__1_ 
_2 2 _ _ 3 _ X 
_3 
J 
_5 Z _ 丄 丄 
J L i J L 
_7 丄丄 
8 3 8 4 
Round 2: 
The elicitor feedbacks Ua to each actor a, and requests two more choices from 
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each actor. 
Actor Ua Choices 
丄 13,5,6.8) fi _ g _ 
16,81 8 _ 
- 3 - 12,61 6 J _ 
丄 {5,6,8} 6 8 _ 
i 仏 3,6.81 1 j _ 
6 12.3.51 5 g _ 
2 _ ^ 二 ^ _ 
8 {} I - I -
After the second round, each actor has already completely ranked his stable 
partners. So, the preference information collected is su伍cient to generate all 
stable matchings, which are shown below: 
//I = { (mi, as), (m2, as), (mg, ag), (m*, ae), (ms, ar), (me, a^), (me, a?)，(my, a^)} 
= {(Ml, «8), (m2, as), (ma, as), (m^, ag), (mg, a?), (me, ai), (me, a?)，(m?，a )^} 
= � m i , as), (m2, ae), (ms, ag), (m*, ag), (ms, a?), (me, ai), (me, ch), (mr, a*)} 
= (m2，as), (ma, a i ) , (m^，ag), (ms, ay), (me, as), (me, a?), (m?，仅4)} 
= {(mi, as), (7712, ae), (ma, ai), {m^, ag), (ms, a八(me, ag), (me, «2), (jn?, a^)} 
= { (mi, ag), (1712, as), (ma, ai), (m*, as), (mg, ^2), (me, as), (me, aj), (m?，^4)} 
"6 = { (mi, as), (m2, as), (mg, ai), (7714, ag), (mg, a?), (me, ag), (mg, ar), (my, a*)} 
= {(mi, as), (m2, ag), (ma, ai), (m*，ag), —5’ ^2), (me, as), (mg, ay), —7, a^)} 
= { (^1, ^3), —2, ae), (^3, a.2), (7714, ag), (ms, ai), (mg, as), (me, ar), (my, “4)} 
Notice that no actor has completely ranked all 8 mates, and so the actors' 
assessment effort is reduced. Besides, in each round, actors are requested to 
rank their first few choices only. 
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6-2 Stage II: Bargaining 
6.2.1 Certainty Equivalence 
We assume the existence of a utility function, on M for each actor a, and 
on A for each mate m. Let ^ be a set of matchings, and C^ be the 
lottery by which a matching is selected randomly from B in such a way that all 
matchings in B have equal chance of being selected. If the arbitrator is going to 
select randomly a matching from B, actor a,s expected utility of the lottery LB 
will be 
EalCs] = Uo^k 
Let Bi, B2 be two sets of matchings, and CB,, CB^ be the lotteries of randomly 
selecting from 81 and B2 respectively. The preference of a candidate over 
is determined by the expected utility of the lotteries. That is, 
“1 T CS, iff E[CB,] > E[CS,] 
CB^ H CB, iff E[CB,] > E[CB,] 
Define actor a's certainty equivalence of the lottery C3, denoted by 
of CB as the mate m e B whose utility is larger but closest to Ea[B]. That is, 
CaiCe) = the mate m that minimize Ua{m) - EalCs] k m y jCb 
A mate m's certainty equivalent of the lottery CB, denoted by (7饥(£0), is simi-
larly defined. 
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6.2.2 The Protocol 
Let Neia^m) be the proportion of matchings in the set of matchings B which 
match actor a to mate m. The bargaining procedure also proceeds in rounds. 
In the first round, the bargaining set Bi will be the set of all stable matchings 
MS. 
In each round z, the arbitrator feedback 馬丨(a,m) to each actor a and each 
mate m, and then requests certainty equivalence from each 
actor and mate respectively. Having received certainty equivalences from all 
candidates, the arbitrator then constructs a reduced bargaining set B^+i, the 
bargaining set of the next round, as follows, 
石HI = { M e Bi I " (a ) ha a ( £ 5 . ) and " (m) VaG A , m G M } 
Intuitively, the bargaining set B‘+i is constructed by retaining only match-
ings in Bi that give each candidate a partner better or equal to their certainty 
equivalences. If the reduced bargaining set is not empty, the expected utility of 
each candidate will be increased. 
Theorem 11 / /氏+1 + 0, all candidates will prefer Csi^^ at least as much as 
Lb�, i.e. Csi^^ hp [b�"ip e A[J M 
Proof: 
For any candiate p E AU M, 
- r ^ 
> 0 
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Therefore, CB� 
Q.E.D. 
6.2.3 Alternative Viewpoint 
Each round i can be viewed as a separate bargaining problem over the set of lot-
tries V{Bi)} with status quo at Suppose for a particular example 
in which the bargaining stage terminates at round n and let CB^^CS^, .. . 
be the status quo of stage 1, 2, • •.，n respectively. 
The whole bargaining stage can be viewed as a bargaining problem over 
I " e V { M s ) } with status quo at CM , - Notice that Cs^ tp CB .^^  hp 
• " - P Vp e A U Af • Plotting £ 队 onto the utility space, we 
can see that the status quo is pushed towards the efficient frontier in each stage. 
Expectej Utilility of d^  ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ Power set 
个 / X X L B > \ o f s 
[ X X X � , X � 
X X ^ L b 2 X X 
X X LB! X X J 
Expected Utilility of dg 
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6.2.4 Discussions 
Although, through the above bargaining procedure, it is possible for the candi-
dates to agree upon a better lottery, there is no guarantee that the final solution 
〔队 is non-dominated. There are two reasons why non-dominated lotteries may 
not be reached : 
(1) In round n, though there are lotteries that dominates the status quo, but 
there is no lottery that dominates the certainty equivalence (see figure). 
(2) Consider a particular round i when there are lotteries that dominate the 
certainty equivalence, and let V be the set of dominating lotteries. The can-
didates agreed upon £谷：+丄 G V. In round i + 1, the bargaining set will be 
二二 I G V{13i+i)}. Lotteries in D, but not in C will be missed. 
Expected Utilility of d j | 
A 
i certainty 
V I ^ equivalence 
X X 丨 X x 丨 ^ ^ ^ 
八 W ： V V 
X ；八••"•A"-^ -— 
X … … x ^ x =x X 
X ： 
^ ^ ^ j w — status quo 
X X ‘ 
w X ? X X X > 
Expected Utilility of ds 
The effectiveness of the bargaining is also dependent on the risk attitudes of 
candidates. Consider two candidates Ci,C2 who have the same set of partners 
. . •，Ps}, and over which they have same preference ranking. Without loss 
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of generality, let both candidates preferences he pi y p^ y ... y p^. Let C^ 
be the lottery of randomly choosing a matching from M , . The utility functions 





» » p 
/ / 
/ M''' Cp 
1 1 1 I I ^ 
Pi P2 P3 P4 Pg Stable Matchings 
When ^d [^Ms] ^ [^Ms]^ we say ci is more risk-averse and C2 is more 
risk-prone. 
Let Bi{c) be the set of matchings in Bi that give candidates better partners 
than their respective certainty equivalences of Note that the more risk-
averse the candidates, the more highly ranked will be their certainty equivalences 
and the smaller will be Bi{c). Consequently, the bargaining set of round i + 1, 
Bi+i = {C]ceMr\ABi{c)}, will be much smaller. 
The risk averseness of the candidates affects the effectiveness of the bargain-
ing protocol in reducing the bargaining set. If the candidates' risk attitudes are 
highly risk-averse, the bargaining set will be more gradually reduced in each 
round. On the contrary, if they are highly risk-prone, the bargaining will be 
reduced rapidly (in comparison) in each round, and it is also more probable 
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that the bargaining set will become empty prematurely. In the extreme cases, 
the reduced bargaining set in the first round is empty, and the arbitrator has to 




We conclude this thesis by summarizing the main results of the present work 
and suggesting directions for further works. 
7.1 Main Results 
(1) Matching Correspondence 
We have investigated the marriage problem from the point of view of social 
choice. In the social choice problem formulated from the marriage problem, 
we found that the domain of the preference profile is restricted. Under such 
restricted domain, weak Condorcet winner always exists. Though the number 
of weak Condorcet winner may be numerous, weak Condorcet winner seems to 
be an ideal social choice correspondence in marriage problem. 
We found that all stable matchings are weak Condorcet winners, and we 
have argued that it is rational for an unbiased matchmaker to pick the solution 
matching randomly from the set of all stable matchings. 
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(2) Solution Approach 
We have introduced the bargaining approach to matching problem. The bar-
gaining stage serves two purpose: (i) reduces the size of the solution set, and 
therefore the arbitrariness involved in the randomly selection, and (ii) improves 
each candidate's expected utility in the random selection. 
(3) Interactive Elicitation of Preference 
We have pinpointed the limitations of one-off approach to matching problem. 
And, we have introduced the interactive approach to preference elicitation. Un-
der this approach, we have shown the possibility of reducing the candidates' 
outranking effort. 
7.2 Suggestions for Further Works 
(1) other Matching Models 
A natural extension to one-to-one matching problems is to the many-to-one and 
the many-to-many case. It seems that the concept of iterative elicitation can be 
directly applied on such cases, but the existence of an fair and rational matching 
correspondence is remained to be proved. 
(2) Improvement on Bargaining Protocol 
We have pointed out that, in the bargaining protocol introduced, efficient lot-
teries may not be reached. More effective bargaining protocol is desirable. 
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(3) Computational Problems 
The computational complexity of enumerating all stable matchings is NP-complete 
•1], and therefore the computation may be excessive for large matching prob-
lem. In our protocol, what we actually need is N�a, m) — the number of stable 
matchings that match actor a to mate e M,a e A. Efficient algorithm 
that can found or estimate N{a, m) is necessary. 
(4) Weak Preference Model 
In this thesis, the preferences of candidates are assumed to be strict, under which 
we can find a fair and rational matching correspondence. Allowing indifference 
and weak preferences should be more realistic so that a candidate may classify 
his partners into indifference classes. The possibilities of a fair and rational 
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